Within this fictional context, we explore the reasons behind Country A’s decision to fund Country B’s research and development of bioweapons. Given that these countries possess distinct socio-economic strengths and are engaged in a covert power struggle, we aim to illuminate the possible motivations and underlying factors driving this knowledge transfer (Fig. 1). By presenting various hypothetical points, we delve into the geopolitical, strategic, and ethical considerations that could shape this collaboration on bioweapons development. Through this analysis, we aim to provide insights into the complexities of international scientific cooperation in the realm of bioweapons, while maintaining a critical perspective on the ethical ramifications and implications for global security.

Comparison between the two hypothetical countries

In order to gain insight into real-world bioethical conflicts due to geopolitics, we made a comparison of the research abilities of America (Country A) and India (Country B).

In this speculative scenario, Country A might opt to fund Country B’s research and development of bioweapons to create a relationship of dependency. By providing financial resources and expertise, Country A can foster a sense of obligation and reliance in Country B, allowing Country A to exert significant influence over Country B’s decisions and strategic direction, according to the Power and Dependency Theory [13]. This dependency allows Country A to guide Country B’s policies, aligning them with its own geopolitical objectives. Through this dependency, Country A can manipulate the course of research, ensuring it serves its interests, whether to gain a competitive advantage or to maintain a favourable balance of power. As Country B becomes increasingly reliant on Country A’s funding and resources, Country A can dictate terms, steer policy discussions, and shape strategic partnerships to its advantage. This could extend to other areas, such as trade, diplomacy, or regional alliances, where Country A’s influence might grow as Country B’s dependency deepens. However, the power imbalance created by such dependency could also foster resentment or backlash, with Country B seeking alternative allies or secretly developing its own capabilities to regain autonomy.

By funding Country B’s bioweapons research, Country A can gather critical intelligence on bioweapon development and testing. This support gives Country A insights into how bioweapons can be used, both offensively and defensively, which is crucial for military planning and strategic decision-making. A historical precedent for this kind of intelligence-gathering is Operation Paperclip. After World War II, the United States recruited German scientists, engineers, and technicians, including those involved in Nazi Germany’s chemical and biological weapons programmes. This allowed the United States to acquire valuable expertise in advanced technologies.

Country A’s funding of Country B’s bioweapons research could reflect a strategic interest in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors, with an eye toward significant economic returns. By financially supporting Country B, Country A could secure rights to new intellectual property, potentially gaining a competitive advantage in the global biotech market. This arrangement might allow Country A, through partnerships with major pharmaceutical companies, to tap into a range of new products and technologies. Big Pharma could play a central role in this dynamic, capitalizing on Country A’s access to bioweapons-related research. By collaborating with Country B, these companies might secure early access to ground-breaking innovations, which they can commercialize in various forms—such as new vaccines, drugs, or biotechnology-based treatments. This commercialization could yield substantial profits for these pharmaceutical giants while bolstering Country A’s economic interests. However, this scenario also raises concerns about equity and global health. If Country A, in collaboration with Big Pharma, monopolizes the research outcomes, it could restrict access to these technologies for countries with lower incomes (Nealey et al. 2015). The high costs of these innovations might put them out of reach for developing nations, leading to disparities in healthcare and creating a divide between wealthier and poorer countries in terms of medical technology access.

Country A’s funding of bioweapons research in Country B may signal a broader strategic alliance between the two nations, aiming to strengthen diplomatic ties and pursue shared goals. This partnership could be designed to foster cooperation on geopolitical and security issues. By investing in Country B’s research, Country A may be signalling a commitment to the alliance, demonstrating its support through financial backing and technology transfer. This strategic alliance might lead to joint research projects, coordinated security efforts, and even a broader geopolitical network that aligns with Country A’s interests. However, strategic alliances that focus on bioweapons carry significant risks. If the partnership breaks down or one party uses the research for malicious purposes, it could lead to destabilization and heightened security threats. This risk was highlighted during the turmoil following the fall of the Soviet Union, when the disintegration of the Soviet alliances resulted in the leakage of nuclear secrets and weapons, creating serious global security concerns (Akhtar 2023)[17]. Also as Country A funds and transfers knowledge to Country B, it loses control over how those bioweapons are used (Ben and Ouagrham-Gormley 2012). Country B could deploy them in ways that counter Country A’s intentions, leading to unintended consequences. Second, if other international players learn about these collaborations, they might start their own bioweapons research, potentially leading to an arms race.

The country A strategy of employing Country B as a proxy to pursue its strategic interests without direct involvement allows Country A to minimize its own direct exposure, potential international repercussions, and maintain a degree of plausible deniability (Zellman 2014). If the research were to face international condemnation or cause unforeseen consequences, Country A could distance itself from the fallout, placing the burden of responsibility on Country B. This insulation from direct involvement helps Country A avoid diplomatic crises, sanctions, or other repercussions that might result from being linked to controversial bioweapons activities. However, the lack of direct oversight and accountability in proxy arrangements can lead to dangerous research practices or deliberate misuse, potentially resulting in severe threats to global health and security. Additionally, this scheme does not remove the ethical burden from the shoulders of Country B. On the contrary, this form of collaboration could build a sense of being shielded from scrutiny in Country B, thus encouraging Country B to not uphold its international responsibilities in limiting the development of biological weapons.

In this speculative exploration, we delve into a hypothetical scenario involving two powerful nations, Country A and Country B, where one enjoys a higher GDP and greater financial resources, while the other experiences rapid economic growth, bolstered by a larger population and notable biotechnological expertise. In the midst of their covert power struggle, Country A decides to fund Country B’s research and development of viruses with potential use as bioweapons, prompting us to examine the possible reasons behind this collaboration. Within this fictional context, we identify various hypothetical points that may explain Country B’s motivations for accepting this arrangement. As we traverse this speculative landscape, it’s essential to remember that these points are entirely fictional, designed for academic exploration. Throughout this analysis, we remain mindful of the ethical concerns and global health security risks associated with bioweapons research and the implications for international scientific cooperation.

Country B’s acceptance of collaboration and funding from Country A could be driven by the potential economic advantages it presents. With financial resources from Country A, Country B can make significant investments in its biotechnological infrastructure, fostering economic growth and innovation (Fan 2011). The influx of funds could enable Country B to build state-of-the-art research facilities, providing a cutting-edge environment for bioweapons research. Additionally, Country B could use this capital to attract highly skilled scientists and procure advanced technology, helping to position itself as a regional hub for biotechnological innovation. These developments can have a ripple effect on Country B’s economy, encouraging broader industrial growth and job creation. The presence of advanced research facilities could attract interest from private industry, leading to new business partnerships and collaboration opportunities. Furthermore, with Country B emerging as a key player in bioweapons research, international investors may see this as a lucrative market, further driving economic development. This could result in a surge of foreign direct investment, fostering new industries and boosting overall economic prosperity in Country B.

Country B’s collaboration with Country A could provide an opportunity to gain access to advanced expertise and knowledge in bioweapons research. Working alongside Country A’s leading scientists, Country B can learn from cutting-edge methodologies and expand its own scientific capabilities (Flink and Schreiterer 2010). This collaboration can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of bioweapons development, enabling Country B to achieve breakthroughs that would otherwise be difficult to attain independently. The increased scientific knowledge can accelerate Country B’s research, leading to a rise in publications and recognition within the scientific community. Country B can strengthen its biodefense, enhancing its ability to counter biological threats. This partnership might enable the development of vaccines, antidotes, and other protective measures, significantly improving Country B’s readiness to handle potential bioweapons attacks.

The partnership with Country A can significantly boost Country B’s global visibility in the scientific and biotechnological landscape. As Country A is widely recognized for its expertise in bioweapons research, its collaboration with Country B lends credibility and recognition to Country B’s efforts. This partnership can draw international attention to Country B’s research endeavours, opening doors to invitations for global scientific conferences, symposia, and other collaborative projects (Dua et al. 2023; Bhattacharya and Kaul 2015). This enhanced visibility can lead to additional research funding from international sources, enabling Country B to expand its research initiatives and attract top talent from around the world. As Country B gains recognition on the global stage, it can also build strategic alliances with other countries, fostering a network of international partnerships that can further strengthen its position in the scientific community.

Country B’s willingness to collaborate with Country A could be part of a broader strategy to strengthen strategic alliances. By engaging in joint bioweapons research, Country B can demonstrate its commitment to fostering deeper cooperation and mutual support with Country A. This collaboration can be viewed as a signal of trust and shared objectives, helping to build a more robust diplomatic relationship between the two countries (Vijayalakshmi 2017). The strategic alliance created through this collaboration could lead to additional benefits for Country B, such as gaining political leverage, preferential trade agreements, security partnerships, or joint initiatives in other areas of mutual interest. By working together on bioweapons research, Country B and Country A can align their strategic interests, promoting stability and cooperation. This collaboration could also serve as a foundation for future projects, reinforcing the alliance and ensuring ongoing support from Country A. However, such collaborations may raise geopolitical concerns, especially if Country B seeks alliances with other nations that are less aligned with Country A’s interests. An example of this is India’s involvement in the BRICS agreement, which has caused notable discontent among U.S. policymakers due to perceived misalignment with their geopolitical strategies (Lalwani and Byrne 2019).

Country B’s participation in bioweapons research could be driven by a sense of national pride and prestige. By engaging in advanced biotechnological research, Country B can showcase its scientific prowess, demonstrating its ability to contribute to cutting-edge fields. The achievements in bioweapons research could become a source of national pride, celebrated as a sign of technological and scientific excellence. This enhanced prestige can elevate Country B’s status and influence on the international stage, positioning it as a key player in global bioweapons research and related domains. This sense of national pride can have broader implications, fostering a sense of unity and confidence within Country B (Hall 2016). The recognition of scientific achievements can inspire future generations to pursue careers in science and technology, leading to a more robust and innovative workforce. Additionally, the increased prestige can help Country B gain international respect, promoting its image as a nation capable of significant contributions to global health security and beyond. This enhanced status can open doors to new opportunities for collaboration, further strengthening Country B’s influence in the global scientific community.